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Why Health Courts are Unconstitutional
Amy Widman*
Introduction
Over the past few decades, there have been repeated proposals to remove medical malpractice claims from the civil justice system entirely. These claims, most of which are
negligence claims, are traditionally brought in state courts and
appear before a jury. The proposals typically focus on removing
the claims from the jury and creating alternate tribunals for adjudication. Often, vague promises that an alternative system
will be more fair to plaintiffs and/or will provide more compensation accompany such proposals. To date, the proposals have
all been struck down. However, the current administration has
made tort reform a priority and once again the topic of specialized health courts is up for discussion.
The most recent proposals have a strong public relations
spin attached to them: Americans are promised a faster, more
reliable system of resolving medical malpractice claims. Constitutional worries are brushed aside with misleading comparisons to other alternative compensation systems like worker's
compensation. However, attacks on claimants' rights to access
the court system and to have a jury hear their complaints
should not be sold to the public with slick and ultimately
groundless promises. These rights, and their obstruction, deserve close constitutional scrutiny. So far the discussion has
not included such analysis. This article examines current administrative compensation schemes and alternative tribunals,
and exposes the important ways health courts would differ from
them. These differences will make the health courts unconstitutional under most state constitutions. Congress should not
* Attorney/Policy Analyst, Center for Justice and Democracy. Former law
clerk to the Hon. Theodore H. Katz, U.S. Magistrate Judge, Southern District of
New York. J.D., cum laude, New York University, 2002; B.A., Northwestern University, 1996. The author would like to thank Joanne Doroshow for her editorial
assistance. Also, thanks to Basel Hamdan and Patrick Buckley for their research
assistance.
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waste valuable time and money with such an unworkable
proposal.
On June 29, 2005, Senator Enzi (R- Wyoming) introduced
legislation that would grant federal money to states in order for
the states to implement specialized health courts.' This legislation, the "Fair and Reliable Medical Justice Act," outlines four
models for the states to use as templates in order to devise a
tort alternative for medical malpractice. 2 The first model includes any proposal that fulfills the goal of being an "alternative
to current tort litigation" and meets the following criteria: "(A)
makes the medical liability system more reliable through
prompt and fair resolution of disputes; (B) encourages the early
disclosure of health care errors; (C) enhances patient safety;
and (D) maintains access to liability insurance."3 In the second
model, the "Early Disclosure and Compensation Model," the
state "require[s] that health care providers or health care organizations notify a patient... of an adverse event that results in
serious injury."4 Such notification is not "an admission of liability."5 Once notification is complete, the health care provider or
organization must make an offer of compensation within a limited period of time and with certain caps based on, as yet, undetermined payment schedules.
If the offer meets the
requirements, the health care provider or organization is immune to tort liability.6 The third model, the "Administrative
1. The Fair and Reliable Medical Justice Act, S. 1337, 109th Cong. (2005).
2. Id. § 3(d).
3. Id. § 3(c)(2).
4. Id. § 3(c)(3).
5. Id. § 3(d)(2)(A).
6. Id. § 3(d)(2)(B). This model is very much the same as the Medical Error
Disclosure and Compensation (MEDiC Act) Program, also known as "Sorry
Works!" which is described in legislation recently introduced by Senators Clinton
and Obama. See The National -MEDiC Act, S. 1784, 109th Cong. (2005). The
MEDiC Act creates an Office of Patient Safety and Healthcare Quality within the
Department of Health and Human Services. Id. § 933(a). The Director of this Office will administer the MEDiC program, along with monitoring patient safety. Id.
The Program offers support to hospitals and doctors willing to implement safety
plans. Under this support, the hospital or doctor is aided in disclosing errors and
offering compensation. There are terms for negotiating compensation, which allows for a third party mediator. Id. § 935 (d)(2). Under the MEDiC Act, the patient retains the right to legal counsel and the right to proceed to the judicial
system if no agreement is reached after six months. Id. § 935(d)(1)(C). It does not
appear that the model proposed in the Enzi legislation contemplates such judicial
redress, however.
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Determination of Compensation Model," creates an administrative entity that is responsible for setting up lists of injuries that
are compensable and a procedure whereby providers and pa7
tients volunteer to participate in this administrative scheme.
The fourth model proposed by this legislation is known as
the "Special Health Care Court Model."8 It is this model that
has generated the most interest and is being strongly encouraged by groups like Common Good and the Progressive Policy Institute. 9 This model is the focus of the article. Part I of
this article will examine the proposed Special Health Care
Courts Model in detail. Part II will examine current alternative
adjudication/compensation schemes like worker's compensation, the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, the birth injury programs in Florida and Virginia, other compensation
schemes, and specialized courts. Part III will compare the
health court proposal to these existing schemes and examine
the centrality of the quid pro quo doctrine in the existing
schemes. Part IV delves further into the constitutional implications of the health court proposal and how the lack of a quid pro
quo magnifies the underlying Seventh Amendment, Due Process, and Equal Protection problems. Finally, Part V concludes
that the proposals are unconstitutional and unworkable relics
of an old political agenda and need to finally be put to rest.

7. The Fair and Reliable Medical Justice Act § 3(d)(3).
8.Id. § 3(d)(4).
9. "Common Good" was founded by Philip K. Howard, Vice-Chairman of the
corporate law firm Covington & Burling, one of the principal architects of the socalled "tort reform" movement as counsel for Big Tobacco. Common Good's contempt for the jury system is contrary to the views of most judges, and the American public who, according to polls, believe that juries are the best arbiters of
disputes that we have in this country. See Carl Deal & Joanne Doroshow, Executive Summary, The CALA Files - The Secret Campaign by Big Tobacco and Other
Major Industries to Take Away Your Rights (Center for Justice & Democracy &
Public Citizen), http://www.centerjd.org/lib/cala.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2006).
Progressive Policy Institute is a research and education institute that is a project
of the Third Way Foundation Inc. and connected to the Democratic Leadership
Council. The authors of the PPI pamphlet, Nancy Udell & David B. Kendall, are
the director of policy and general counsel for Common Good, respectively. See infra note 12.
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The Special Health Courts Model

The Fair and Reliable Medical Justice Act describes a
model where a state creates an alternative "court" staffed by
judges who are experts in health care. 10 The court will commission expert witnesses and the judges will rely on these experts
in order to make binding determinations as to causation, compensation, standards of care, and related issues.1 ' This skeletal
model has since been fleshed out by Common Good, the Progressive Policy Institute, and researchers at the Harvard School of
Public Health. 12 The proposal that is taking shape has the following key features: specialized judges with an expertise in
health care; experts hired by the health court; a modified form
of negligence (termed "avoidability"); a compensation schedule;
13
no juries; and no access to civil court review.
Who are these judges? In Progressive Policy Institute's
plan, the judges are lawyers appointed by governors. 14 Candi15
dates would have a background in science and/or medicine.
Common Good and the Harvard team looked at two possible
systems-what they term the "early offer model" and the "administrative law judge plus" model. 16 The early offer model is a
Bush Administration proposal that puts the decision-making
authority in the hands of the individual insurer or hospital.
10. See The Fair and Reliable Medical Justice Act, S. 1337, 109th Cong.,
§ 3(d)(4)(A) (2005).
11. Id. § 3(d)(4)(C).
12. Symposium, Troyen Brennen et al., Transcript, Administrative Approaches to Compensating for Medical Injuries: National and InternationalPerspectives (Harvard School of Public Health & Common Good, Oct. 31, 2005),
available at http://cgood.org/assets/attachments/Transcript_--October-31stEvent.pdf [hereinafter Transcript]; NANCY UDELL & DAVID B. KENDALL, HEALTH
COURTS: FAIR AND RELIABLE JUSTICE FOR INJURED PATIENTS (Progressive Policy Institute Feb. 2005), available at http://www.ppionline.org/documents/healthcourts0217.pdf [hereinafter PPI pamphlet]; AN URGENT CALL FOR SPECIAL HEALTH
COURTS: AMERICA NEEDS A RELIABLE SYSTEM OF MEDICAL JUSTICE (Common Good),
http://cgood.org/assets/attachments/130.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2006) [hereinafter
Common Good Pamphlet].
13. See Transcript, supra note 12; see PPI pamphlet, supra note 12; see Common Good Pamphlet, supra note 12.
14. PPI pamphlet, supra note 12, at 9.
15. Id.
16. MICHELLE M. MELLO ET AL., HEALTH COURTS: SYSTEM OVERVIEW AND CURRENT RESEARCH (Harvard School of Public Health 2006), http://cgood.org/assets/at-

tachments/HSPHPresentationrevisedt.pdf.
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This model purportedly creates incentives for such key industry
players to make early offers of compensation. The "administrative law judge plus" model takes specialized judges and guides
them in their decision-making through additional input of med17
ical experts.
To date, Common Good has not elaborated on exactly how
one could combine these two models, but it appears that both
the insurers' and the hospitals' viewpoints will heavily aid some
form of specialized judge in his decision-making. In one proposal, the insurer or the hospital convenes a panel to screen
claims and renders the preliminary decision.' 8 A dissatisfied
claimant may then choose to take his claim to health court for a
second review by a specialized judge, appointed by a "nonpartisan screening commission," who would determine whether or
not the claim is compensable. 19 This determination would be
based on information "gather[ed] . . .from the facility, through
queries to the patient and.., in some cases through an independent medical examination of the patient. The health court
would then render a decision drawing heavily on the indepen,""20 This decision may be appealed
dent expert input . .
outside the health court system, but only on an arbitrary and
21
capricious standard.
According to these proposals, the experts, then, would play
a very large role in advising the specialized judge. A fact which
begs the questions: Who are the experts and what are the procedures by which they are chosen? It is not clear that these details have been examined as closely as they must; at this point
the most anyone has proposed is that the experts be "neutral"
22
and commissioned by the court.
17. See Transcript, supra note 12, at 9.
18. Id. at 10-11.
19. Id. at 9.
20. Id. at 10-11.
21. In deciding on this standard of review for appeals outside the health court
system, Troyen Brennan states, "[wie think there would probably be less appeals,
or less successful appeals, from an arbitrary and capricious standard. But we feel
that is necessary." Id. at 11.
22. See The Fair and Reliable Medical Justice Act, S. 1337, 109th Cong.
§ 3(d)(4)(C) (stating "reliance on independent expert witnesses commissioned by
the court"); see also PPI pamphlet, supra note 12, at 9 ("Access to impartial, unbiased expert testimony on the standards of care is essential for a reliable system").
Practically every time health courts are discussed the importance of neutral ex-
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As for the standard of liability, the proposal being discussed
most recently and fervently is a new standard entitled
"avoidability."23 Avoidability appears to draw from a standard
applied in Sweden and lies somewhere between negligence and
strict liability. 24 It is definitely not a "no-fault" standard. 25 In
fact, contrary to many glossy press releases, the same people
designing the current model and often describing it as "no-fault"
have written in legal journals that "the tag 'no-fault' is somewhat misleading because the central notion of 'avoidability' is
actually interpreted quite differently."2 6 In studying the results
of Sweden's avoidability standard, it is clear that this standard
creates a higher standard for compensation than no-fault.2 7 In
addition, similar studies have found a "non-trivial failure rate
28
of claims" under this approach.
The avoidability standard states that an injured person is
eligible for compensation if the injury would not have happened
perts is addressed. The problem is the experts "neutrality" is assumed based on
the court's commission; however it remains unclear who the judges are and how
they will be appointed. Without more understanding of the decision-makers, it is
impossible to evaluate the "neutrality" of any experts. The ultimate goal is to reduce the use of "hired guns" but there is no mechanism yet in place to remove the
possibility of the health courts just hiring "hired guns" for the industry. The nature of our adversarial system is to allow a truth to emerge from two sides arguing
zealously. The "neutral" experts in these proposals are quite suspect.
23. David M. Studdert et al., Can the United States Afford a 'No-Fault'System
of Compensation for Medical Injury? 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Spring 1997).
24. Id. Also, note that Sweden, which is often cited as the model for the current health court proposal, allows for tort remedies to co-exist alongside their
health courts. See Transcript, supra note 12, at 17. Moreover, Sweden has an
array of other public benefits that offset costs of injuries regardless of any claims.
Id. In the U.S., however, where there are very few public benefits, the proponents
of health courts are adamant about the exclusivity of health courts and removal of
all access to the court system. Id. at 10-11. This can only result in injured people
having to shoulder much more of the cost of the injury, without any accountability
mechanisms being placed on the health care industry. Once the details are examined, the reality of this proposal is a frightening deviation from the Swedish
model it claims to emulate.
25. See Transcript, supra note 12, at 10 (stating that the avoidability standard has "some similarities to the negligence standard").
26. See Studdert, supra note 23, at 8. If the term "no-fault" is "somewhat misleading," why is it the main descriptive term aligned with health court proposals?
This article posits that it is because the proponents of health courts recognize the
insurmountable Constitutional hurdle associated with removing long-standing
common law remedies from the civil justice system without any compromise.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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had optimal care been given. 29 It is unclear how this alters a
traditional negligence standard, which is often described as
"but, for." However, an avoidability standard contemplates
some element of fault in that there is a judgment that care was
somehow sub-optimal and this lower level of care resulted in
injury. This element of fault is one of the most suspect parts of
the proposal, and will be explored throughout the article.
Once a patient has filed a claim with the insurance panel,
appealed it to the special health court and the administrative
judge rules in his favor based on the advice and expertise of
experts, picked by some unaccountable screening board, the patient is eligible for compensation. The non-economic compensa30
tion will be based on a schedule.
Since these proposals are still very much in a planning
stage, many of the accountability problems may be addressed in
future discussions. Political capture of specialized courts is a
well-researched phenomenon and clearly there are many opportunities for capture in these proposed schemes. 3 1 Such political
realities, however, are outside the scope of this article. This article is limited in scope to the problematic fault scheme and its
constitutional implications.
II.

Alternative Programs

The one element of the proposed health court that is most
constitutionally troubling is the avoidance standard of fault
coupled with the absences ofjuries. Proponents of health courts
wave away the jury question by citing to worker's compensation, vaccine injury compensation, tax courts, and even the Na29. See Transcript, supra note 12, at 11.
30. The compensation schedule is an extremely contentious part of any specialized administrative compensation scheme and outside the scope of this article.
However, for more on this issue, see DANIEL MONT ET AL, WORKERS' COMPENSATION: BENEFITS, COVERAGE AND COSTS, 2000 NEW ESTIMATES (Nat'l Acad. of Soc.
Ins. 2002); ROBERT T. REVILLE ET AL., TRENDS IN EARNINGS LOSS FROM DISABLING
WORKPLACE INJURIES IN CALIFORNIA: THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC CONDITIONS (2002);

Workers Comp.: Falling Down on the Job 2000, 65 CONSUMER REPORTS 28 (Feb.
2000) [hereinafter Falling Down].
31. See generally Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1990) (analyzing specialized
courts and arguing for a presumption against establishing such courts).
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tional Labor Relations Board. 32 Although each of these
programs was built on a different authorizing structure, they
all share an adjudication function without the aid of juries.
They are also all distinguishable from health courts. The compensation schemes are all based on no-fault models, and the remaining alternative schemes adjudicate public, federallycreated rights, not private long-standing state common law

rights.

33

The academic literature has not clearly addressed the different forms of administrative adjudication and the public debate around health courts further muddles this area.
Administrative schemes like worker's compensation, the vaccine injury compensation program and the Florida and Virginia
Birth Injury Compensation Programs are compensation
schemes created by Congress and/or state legislatures and built
on a no-fault system. 34 Tax court, bankruptcy court and agency
tribunals like the National Labor Relations Board are created
by Congress for the purpose of interpreting agency rules and
32. This comparison is made repeatedly. See, e.g., PPI pamphlet, supra note
12, at 5; Common Good pamphlet, supra note 12, at 4; Postings of Philip K. Howard to Legal Affairs, The Debate Club - The Doctor's Court?, http://www.legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/debateclub-medmal0305.msp (Mar. 14, 2005, 09:03 EST);
Paul Barringer, Let's Create Health Courts, NAT'L L.J., May 2, 2005, at 22.
33. The Supreme Court discusses the significance of this difference in a line of
Seventh Amendment cases. See, e.g., Tull v. U.S., 481 U.S. 412 (1987);
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996). Moreover, although the Court has held that
the Seventh Amendment is not applicable to administrative proceedings, see Atlas
Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 454
(1977), this was in reference to public rights. The distinction between public and
private rights remains an important one in this case. Negligence is a long-standing common law cause of action and as such makes the jury requirement a
stronger consideration. See Margaret L. Moses, What the Jury Must Hear: The
Supreme Court's Evolving Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence, 68 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 183 (2000).
34. These strict liability compensation systems function to provide compensation to injured persons while creating very little deterrence function. This concept
is more relevant to some situations than others. For example, the 9/11 Victim
Compensation Fund is a better example of when a strict liability compensation
system can work, because there is a limited class of claimants and the Fund had a
dedicated funding stream. Although the current health courts proposals do not
even fall into the category of a strict liability compensation system, one is hardpressed to understand how medical malpractice claims could ever fit into a no-fault
compensation scheme due to the limitless class and injuries, as well as the need for
deterrence.
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regulations. 35 This article attempts to categorize these different
alternative schemes and at the same time expose why health
courts do not fit in to any established model. Instead, health
courts represent a new model that draws from both the administrative and specialized court models, while neglecting to incorporate the constitutional safeguards within each of those
models. The end result is a very troubling, and, this article
posits, unconstitutional, coup of power away from the juries.
A.

Worker's Compensation

Worker's compensation programs are run by states and
vary between jurisdictions. 36 Generally, however, the program
compensates employees, injured in the scope of their employment and protects fellow employees and employers from liability for employment-related injuries.3 7 Employers are required
to obtain insurance to cover workplace injuries and also contribute to the compensation fund. 38 The injured employee files a
claim and receives compensation based on a schedule of bene39
fits; there is no adjudication of fault required.
Worker's compensation came about in the early part of the
twentieth century, notably as a social justice initiative by
worker advocates. 40 Moreover, at the time worker's compensa35. See, e.g., United States Tax Court, About the Court, http://www.ustax
court.gov/about.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2006); U.S. Courts, United States Bankruptcy Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/bankruptcycourts.html (last visited Oct.
28, 2006); see generally National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006).
36. For general information on workers' compensation systems, see ARTHUR
LARSON, WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION LAW

(2006). See also AMY

WIDMAN, WORKERS'

(Center for Justice & Democracy 2006), available at http://centerjd.orgWorkers'Comp(National).pdf.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Worker's Compensation programs have been subjected to much criticism.
A Consumer Reports investigation in 2000 was highly critical of worker's compensation, finding that these laws "have generated profit for insurers and savings for
employers mainly at the expense of injured workers. Those laws clamped down on
benefits, raised eligibility requirements, and put medical treatment mainly in the
hands of insurance companies, which can delay or deny medical care or income
payments." Falling Down, supra note 30, at 28. See also U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
COMPENSATION: A CAUTIONARY TALE

REPORT ON THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS

136 (1972) (declaring "in recent years serious questions have been raised concerning the fairness and adequacy of present workmen's compensation laws . . ").
40. ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 2.00 (2006) ("The necessity for worker's compensation arose out of the coincidence of a sharp increase
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tion was proposed, employers already enjoyed complete immunity from claims by injured workers. In other words, worker's
compensation created new statutory rights that did not exist at
common law. This is a very important difference from the
health courts proposal.
Proponents of the health court models quickly play down
the lack of juries in the new system by citing to worker's compensation. 4 1 Such a comparison is not a fair analogy. Worker's
compensation is a no-fault scheme. This is the compromise the
courts have upheld. 42 If there is no fault to be litigated, then an
alternative administrative tribunal is not as troubling. The determination of fault is the quintessential jury function. As the
court states in one of the seminal cases upholding worker's compensation: "Indeed, the criterion which is thought to be free
from constitutional objection, the criterion of fault, is the application of an external standard, the conduct of a prudent man in
the known circumstances, that is, in doubtful cases, the opinion

of the jury .

...43

Finally, as explained above, the rights gained through
worker's compensation programs were not rights that employees had at common law at the time of the program's formulation. This means that when worker's compensation was
created, legislators were creating new rights and choosing to
compensate injured workers through an alternative administrative system rather than removing existing common law rights
from the jury. The Supreme Court has pointed to this differin industrial accidents attending the rise of the factory system and a simultaneous
decrease in the employee's common law remedies for his or her injuries."). This is
not the case with tort reform laws, where the protection is being extended to the
tortfeasor rather than the injured. See Jane R. Ward, Virginia's Birth-Related
NeurologicalInjury CompensationAct: Constitutionaland Policy Challenges, 22 U.
RICH. L. REV. 431, 437 (1988).
41. See sources cited supra note 32.
42. See N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917) ("The statute
under consideration sets aside one body of rules only to establish another system
in its place. If the employee is no longer able to recover as much as before in case
of being injured through the employer's negligence, he is entitled to moderate compensation in all cases of injury, and has a certain and speedy remedy without the
difficulty and expense of establishing negligence or proving the amount of
damages.").
43. Ariz. Copper Co. v. Hammer, 250 U.S. 400, 432 (1918) (Holmes, J.
concurring).
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ence as a determining factor when assessing the constitutional44
ity of removing common law claims from civil courts.
B.

Vaccine Injury Compensation Program

The Vaccine Injury Compensation Program-created by
federal statute as the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of
1986-went into effect on October 1, 1988.45 Like worker's compensation, it is a no-fault compensation system. In other words,
if you or your child receives a covered vaccine and then presents
a covered injury from the vaccine, you or your child is entitled to
compensation. 46 A table, created and modified by the Secretary
of Health and Human Services, sets the covered vaccines, the
47
covered injuries, and the amount of compensation.
Critics contend that the process is heavily weighted against
the injured parties, the process takes too long, and the Secretary has removed too many injuries from the table. 48 There have
been extreme problems with access and compensation for victims under the current Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. 49 Although originally proposed as a no-fault model that
would be efficient and provide for quick compensation, many ar44. In its Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has consistently relied on a public right/private right distinction, stating that the Seventh Amendment does not allow Congress to assign adjudication of a private right that is legal
in nature to an administrative agency or specialized court without juries. See
Granfinanceria, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 n.4 (1989). Private rights are
defined as "the liability of one individual to another." Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S.
22, 51 (1932). See also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 430 U.S. 450, 458 (1977) ("Our prior cases support administrative
factfinding in only those situations involving 'public rights,' e.g., where the Government is involved in its sovereign capacity under an otherwise valid statute creating enforceable public rights. Wholly private tort, contract, and property cases,
as well as a vast range of other cases, are not at all implicated."). Although the
Seventh Amendment is not necessarily applicable to state health court programs,
the distinction between the type of right at issue is informative.
45. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 201 (2000).
46. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, NATIONAL VACCINE INJURY COMP. PROGRAM FACT SHEET (2002), http://www.hrsa.gov/osp/vicp/fact

_sheet.htm [hereinafter National Vaccine Fact Sheet].
47. Id.

48. See sources cited infra note 52 and 54.
49. See Elizabeth C. Scott, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act Turns
Fifteen, 56 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 351, 359 (2001) (stating that, as of 2001, 75% of
claims were denied after long and contentious legal battles taking an average of 7
years to resolve).
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gue that the Program has been co-opted by political forces and
turned into a victim's nightmare. 50 This has occurred by the
agency determinations to remove certain injuries from the covered table, and limit the statute of limitations in such a way as
to foreclose many claims. 5 1 Once a claim is removed from the
table, the element of no-fault is also removed. The claimant is
then left with the frustrating task of litigating fault in an administrative setting without the full procedural safeguards of
civil courts to guide the litigation. Personal anecdotes of those
who have attempted to utilize the system describe waits of more
than ten years and an increasingly adversarial nature to the
"no-fault" proceedings.5 2 Even with the morphing of the Program into an increasingly fault-based standard, the Vaccine
Program still contemplates a no-fault arena for certain injuries.
The Program's slow political capture and subsequent demise as
an adequate alternative for victims should, if anything, serve as
a loud warning as to the vulnerability of a fault-based alternative tribunal to address injured medical consumers.
C.

Virginia and FloridaBirth Injury Courts

At first glance, it may appear as if the Florida and Virginia
Birth Injury Compensation Funds are most analogous to the
proposed health courts.5 3 These two states created programs
50. Id.; see also Compensating Vaccine Injury: Are Reforms Needed?: House

OversightHearing Before the H. Subcomm. on CriminalJustice, Drug Policy and
Human Resources, 106th Cong. (Sept. 28, 1999) (statement of Barbara Loe Fisher,
Co-Founder & President, National Vaccine Information Center) (discussing the
unilateral power that the Department of Health & Human Services has to change
the burdens of proof and other restrictions); Derry Ridgway, No-Fault Vaccine Insurance: Lessons from the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 24 J.
HEALTH POL'Y & L. 59, 69 (1999) (describing how the program originally awarded
many more claims, until the Department of Justice decided to aggressively argue
against claimants) [hereinafter Lessons].
51. See, e.g., Lessons, supra note 43, at 86.
52. See Scott, supra note 49, at 358 (discussing "horror stories about the
length of time it takes them to process the case and receive compensation... [and]
families who've gone bankrupt trying to meet their children's medical and emotional needs while going through the system."). Scott also notes the adversarial
nature of these "combative mini-trials," where, even after the decision to compensate is made, veteran DOJ litigators "fight over minutia like the future cost of
diapers in a certain state." Id. at 361-63.
53. See generally The Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act,
FLA. STAT. §§ 766.301-.316 (2006); The Birth-related Neurological Injury Compensation Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5000 to 5021 (2006).
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similar to the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program to handle
a very small subcategory of birth injury cases. Again, there are
important differences between these models and what is now
being proposed. First, and most important, is that these programs are no-fault models. As with worker's compensation and
vaccine injury, the no-fault aspect is the touchstone of the
model.5 4 These models all purport to remove the burden of proof
in exchange for removing claims from civil court.
Florida's model has another important procedural safeguard: it allows claimants to opt-out of the administrative
scheme and proceed in civil court under normal litigation rules,
provided the claimants were not given notice prior to delivery of
participation in the alternative compensation plan. 55 The Florida statute also provides for civil remedies "where there is clear
and convincing evidence of bad faith or malicious purpose or
willful and wanton disregard of human rights, safety, or property, provided that such suit is filed prior to and in lieu of pay56
ment of an award under" the alternative compensation plan.
Some commentators have lamented this limited safeguard because many claimants continue to choose their civil justice
rights over the administrative model.5 7 However, this may in
itself provide a reason to retain access to courts, because it provides empirical proof that, from the injured person's point of
view, the civil justice system is often a better process.
Although the Florida Birth Injury Program has never been
challenged on constitutional grounds, its opt-out provisions
would clearly play a large determinative role in assessing its
54. At least one commentator has noted that even so, the birth injury courts
are not analogous to worker's compensation because the background against which
the program was passed was such where injured persons had many more rights
that the program removed, in contrast to worker's compensation, which was an
effort to expand the rights of the injured. Therefore, according to this view, just
making the system no-fault is not enough of a quid pro quo from the injured person's viewpoint. See Ward, supra note 40, at 441 ("The quid pro quo rationale underlying worker's compensation laws cannot justify the Act. The Act takes much
from and gives little to injured children.").
55. See Univ. of Miami v. Ruiz, 916 So. 2d 865, 868-70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2005).
56. FLA. STAT. § 766.303(2) (2006).
57. See, e.g., Sandy Martin, NICA-Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury
Compensation Act: Four Reasons Why This Malpractice Reform Must be Eliminated, 26 NovA L. REV. 609 (2002).
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constitutionality. 5 Florida caselaw applies a heightened standard, known as the Kluger test, to legislative attempts to circumvent a claimant's right to access the courts. 59 This standard
has allowed legislation only where a right to recourse in civil
court with a jury remains as an alternative option. 60 The health
courts as proposed, with a quasi-fault standard and no opt-out
provision or even a meaningful right of review in civil court,
would most likely be constitutionally suspect in Florida under
the Kluger test.
Virginia's Birth Injury Program was enacted after the Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that Virginia's cap on damages in
medical malpractice cases did not violate state constitutional
guarantees. 6 1 Attorneys and scholars generally agree that the
Virginia administrative scheme suffers from administrative
58. Florida courts have repeatedly upheld the right to redress of an injury and
the opt-out provision in Florida preserves that right by continuing to allow claimants to access the civil justice system. The Florida courts apply a similar test to
the quid pro quo analysis discussed below to determine the boundaries of legislation affecting access to the courts. See Smith v. Dep't of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla.
1987) (finding caps on non-economic damages unconstitutional under the right to
access the courts); Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973) (finding a legislative
restriction on the right to sue for claims under $550 for economic damages unconstitutional). The court upheld a cap if the parties choose to arbitrate, however this
statute did not affect claimant's rights to access the civil justice system where
there remain no caps. See Univ. of Miami v. Echarte, 618 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 1993).
59. See Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4 ("Where a right of access to the courts for
redress for a particular injury has been provided by statutory law predating the
adoption of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the State of Florida, or
where such a right has become part of the common law of the State... the Legislature is without power to abolish such a right without providing a reasonable alternative to protect the rights of the people of the State to redress for injuries, unless
the Legislature can show an overpowering public necessity for the abolishment of
such right, and no alternative method of meeting such public necessity can be
shown.").
60. See Echarte, 618 So. 2d at 189.
61. See Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Servs. of Richmond, Inc., 509 S.E.2d
307 (Va. 1999); Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989). It must
be noted that the program was enacted under direct fiat from the insurance companies. The state's main insurance provider stopped providing obstetrical insurance. When asked what would be needed to make them provide insurance again,
the provider responded: "If the legislature passes legislation which takes the
'birth-related neurological injury' out of the tort system, we will lift the moratorium . . . " David G. Duff, Compensation for Neurologically Impaired Infants:
Medical No-Fault in Virginia, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 391, 405 (1990) (citing Letter
from Gordon D. McLean, Executive Vice-President, The Virginia Insurance Reciprocal to Ronald K. Davis, Virginia Surgical Associates, Chairman of MSV's Professional Liability Committee dated Jan. 13, 1987).
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problems, 62 however, the Birth Injury Program has never been
challenged on constitutional grounds, most likely because the
upholding of caps in Virginia creates a presumption that the
Birth Injury Program would stand.
However, the Virginia courts' approval of caps, and the
Birth Injury Program's continued use, does not translate into
automatic approval of all administrative health injury schemes,
including the proposed health courts. In upholding the caps,
the court was very clear that because caps are awarded after
the fact-finding process, they do not impinge upon the state
right to access courts and trial by jury. 63 The court even stated,
"The province of the jury is to settle questions of fact and...
[olnce the jury has ascertained the facts and assessed the damages. . . the constitutional mandate is satisfied." 64 This precedent may be one reason that the Birth Injury Compensation
Fund has not been challenged in Virginia. Arguably the Virginia birth injury scheme does not apply any fact-finding process since it is a no-fault standard and this might lean toward
its constitutionality. However, the sweeping vision of the
health courts proposal, combined with its rejection of a no-fault
standard, should be enough for Virginia courts to strike such a
proposal down as unconstitutional under its state constitution.
D.

Other CompensationSchemes
The Price-Anderson Act was enacted in 1957 as an amend-

ment to the Atomic Energy Act. 65 It set up a system of private

insurance and government indemnity in the case of a nuclear
accident. 66 The ultra-hazardous nature of nuclear power meant
that this was an area of tort law already covered by strict liability standards. The Act did not originally preempt state tort law
62. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Market and Regulatory Approaches to Medical Malpractice:The Virginia No-Fault Statute, 74 VA. L. REV. 1451 (1988); Bill
McElway, Study Faults Programfor Brain-Injured; Shortcomings Found in Care
for Children, RicH. TIMEs-DISPATCH, Nov. 13, 2002, at Al (citing a study by the
Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission criticizing many aspects of the
program, including the lack of accountability. "Because there is no oversight of
this program, at a minimum it presents the appearance that the program and
board do not have to account for their actions."); see also Ward, supra note 40.
63. Etheridge, 376 S.E.2d at 525.
64. Id. at 529.
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210-14 (2000).
66. Id.
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claims, 67 but later amendments created an exclusive federal
68
cause of action for these claims.
More recently, in the weeks immediately following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress passed the Air
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001.69
This legislation simultaneously removed any possibility of liability claims against the airlines and, in exchange, provided
compensation to families of victims of the attacks.7 0 Again, this
was a scheme where one was automatically awarded compensation, another no-fault scheme. The 9/11 Victim Relief Fund was
also generously funded at the outset and covered a very limited
class of claimants. 71 While generally thought of as a more successful use of compensation funds because of its narrow scope
and dedicated funding, the 9/11 Fund is not without its own un72
fair realities.
There is another compensation scheme currently being debated in Congress that would create a compensation fund for
victims of asbestos.7 3 Although at this point the legislation is
being debated, it is notable that the legislation contains a clear
statement of its no-fault standard: "An asbestos claimant shall
not be required to demonstrate that the asbestos-related injury
for which the claim is being made resulted from the negligence
or other fault of any other person." 74 The statute authorizing
this asbestos compensation fund also provides for judicial re67. See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-Mcgee Corp., 464 U.S. 252-53 (1984); Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 89 (1978).
68. See In re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. II, 940 F.2d 832 (3rd Cir. 1991). The
Price-Anderson Act, although cited by health court proponents as a similar model,
is not really comparable because it contains such highly improbable criteria in order to apply.
69. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001, 49
U.S.C.A. § 40101 (West 2001).
70. Id.
71. Id. §§ 405(c), 406.
72. See RAND INST. FOR CIL
JUSTICE, RESEARCH BRIEF, Compensating the
Victims of 9/11 (2004), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/researchbriefs/
RB9087/indexl.html.; Press Release, Office of the Attorney General, New York
State, Governor, Attorney General Object to 9/11 Compensation Fund Rules (Jan.
23, 2002) (arguing that the fund unfairly excludes many victims, and inadequately
compensates others).
73. See The Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2005, S. 852, 109th
Cong. (2005).
74. Id. § 112. The author makes no comment as to the constitutionality of this
proposed legislation.
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view of awards, albeit limited to filing in the resident United
States Court of Appeals. 75 Consumer advocates are sounding
preliminary cautions, noting that a compensation fund in this
area would grossly under-compensate injured claimants; how76
ever such discussions are outside the scope of this article.
E. National Labor Relations Board
At least a few times, advocates of the health court proposals
have pointed to the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) as support for the constitutionality of
health courts. 77 This is confounding, as the NLRB is a completely different administrative model. The NLRB, formed in
1935 by Congressional statute, the National Labor Relations
Act, was created to adjudicate administrative rights created by
this act. 78 In other words, these were what the Supreme Court
79
has termed "public rights" created by statutory law.
The Constitution envisions a system whereby Congress
may create rights and, upon doing so, may also limit those
rights. It is clear that administrative tribunals are constitutionally acceptable forums in which to interpret administratively created rights.8 0 Moreover, administrative decisions
rendered by the NLRB are subject to review in a United States
Court of Appeals."' It is clear, however, that the NLRB model is
in no way analogous to the health courts proposal and, although
informative in terms of the institutional problems faced by the
NLRB, the constitutionality and general acceptance of the
75. Id. § 302.
76. See, e.g., PETER S.

BARTH, COMMENTARY ON THE CREATION OF A FUND FOR
VICTIMS OF ASBESTOS CAUSED DISEASES (U.S. ACTION Feb. 15, 2005), availableat

http://www.usaction.orgatf/cf/%7BB61F1B77-C265-416B-83EA-800FB44717CB%
7D/Report%20by%20Professor%2OPeter%20Barth%20on%203%20federal%20programs.pdf; see also S. REP. No. 109-97, The Fairnessin Asbestos Injury Resolution
Act of 2005, at 187 (2005) (minority views of Senators Kennedy, Biden, Feingold,
and Durbin).
77. See sources cited supra note 32.
78. The National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006),
created a statutory right for employees to organize and to bargain collectively with
their employers.
79. See supra Part II.A discussion and footnotes.
80. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n,
430 U.S. 442, 458 (1997).
81. See NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(f).
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NLRB bears no weight on an assessment of a health court
proposal.
F. Other Specialized Courts
Health court advocates also cite to specialized courts created by Congress to handle tax, patent or bankruptcy matters
in an effort to support their proposal.8 2 At the outset, some clarification is needed. There are no specialized patent courts; patent claims are brought in federal district court.8 3 Bankruptcy
court is situated within federal court and, although bankruptcy
judges are not Article III judges, all of their rulings are subject
to review in the district court.8 4 Therefore, these "specialized
courts" are branches of the federal judicial system rather than
legislative or administrative courts providing alternative tribunals. Tax Court is an Article I court established by Congress as
a forum to dispute tax deficiencies, however it coexists as a remedy with the district courts and is also subject to review by the
85
United States Court of Appeals.
Tax court has been recognized as judicial in character, but
it only hears matters arising between a taxpayer and the Federal Government. In reviewing both the origin and the constitutionality of these courts, the Supreme Court has formulated
and refined the public rights doctrine.8 6 This doctrine began
82. See, e.g., Scalpel, Scissors, Lawyer, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 14, 2005 ("The
idea is partly modeled on the specialist courts that deal with other complex technical issues, such as patent disputes and bankruptcy."); Mike Norbut, Thinking
Outside the Jury Box: Another Tort Reform Answer, AM. MED. NEWS, Nov. 14, 2005
(claiming that the legal process has already "established special courts for bankruptcy, tax and patent disputes"); Postings of Philip K. Howard to Legal Affairs,
The Debate Club - The Doctor's Court?, http://www.legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/
debateclubmedmal0305.msp (Mar. 14, 2005, 03:03 EST) (Mr. Howard, in arguing
for health courts, says "America has a long tradition of special courts .... Today
there are patent courts, bankruptcy courts and a wide range of administrative
courts, including worker's compensation, Social Security, and vaccine liability.").
83. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is sometimes colloquially referred to as "patent court" because it hears a majority of patent cases. This
is an Article III federal appeals court. See, e.g., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, About the Court, http://www.fedcir.gov/about.html (last visited Oct.
28, 2006).
84. See, e.g., U.S. Courts, United States Bankruptcy Courts, http://www.us
courts.gov/bankruptcycourts.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2006).
85. See, e.g., United States Tax Court, About the Court, http://www.ustax
court.gov/about.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2006).
86. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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with the premise that there are certain matters "which, from
[their] nature, [are] the subject of a suit at the common law, or
in equity, or admiralty," known as private rights.8 7 On the contrary, public rights "may be presented in such a form that the
judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which [C]ongress may or
may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United
States, as it may deem proper."88 In other words, where Congress creates rights by statute, it may also establish adminis89
trative courts to handle disputes arising out of the statute.
After years of refining these descriptions, it is clear that Congress may not circumvent the Seventh Amendment right to a
jury trial in civil cases by merely removing wholly private tort,
contract, or property cases from civil court and placing these
matters in administrative or legislative tribunals. 90
In any case, the rhetoric espoused by proponents of health
courts is seriously misleading. The proposed health courts are
in no way analogous to worker's compensation and other alternative compensation schemes, nor bankruptcy or tax courts for
the reasons explained above. Rather than adjudicating public
rights, health courts propose to remove long-standing common
law rights between private citizens from the civil justice system,
thereby circumventing all judicial safeguards embodied within
the current system, the most important of which are impartial
judges and juries.

87.
88.
89.
ognized

Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1855).
Id. at 284.
Tax court is a quasi-administrative court, although it has always been recas judicial in character and does not perform the policy-making, investiga-

tory or regulatory duties usually performed by administrative tribunals like the
NLRB. Tax court judges are appointed by the President with the advice and con-

sent of the Senate, but they do not enjoy lifetime tenure as Article III judges
would. See United States Tax Court, About the Court, http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/
about.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2006).
90. Granfinanceria, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 51 (1989). Although the
Seventh Amendment would not be implicated in state constitutional claims arising
out of state pilot health programs, the doctrine is useful in terms of delineating
how the lines are drawn between administrative and judicial tribunals.
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Comparison and the Issue of Quid Pro Quo

Comparison of Health Court Proposal to Current
Alternative Tribunals

The proponents of the health court model often cite to the
existence of administrative compensation schemes and other alternative tribunals where juries are not employed. 91 Such reliance is misplaced and misleading, as the cursory descriptions
above begin to detail. The main differences are that health
courts propose to remove long-standing common law state
rights from the civil justice system and place them in an alternative system without juries, without any accountability mechanisms, without procedural safeguards, and without any
meaningful appeals process. These hardships, coupled with the
burden of having to prove fault, render the injured claimant virtually powerless and at the mercy of the insurance and hospital
industries. There is no other system out there that does what
these proposals posit. In a legal landscape where much more
subtle tort reforms are found unconstitutional by many state
courts, 92 it is inconceivable that a state court would uphold such
a blatant attempt to remove power from juries.

91. See sources cited supra note 32.
92. For example, the following is a non-exhaustive list of state courts that
have found caps on damages unconstitutional: Smith v. Schulte, 671 So. 2d 1334
(Ala. 1995); Henderson v. Ala. Power Co., 627 So. 2d 878 (Ala. 1993); Moore v.
Mobile Infirmary Assoc., 592 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1991); Smith v. Dep't of Ins., 507 So.
2d 1080 (Fla. 1987); Best v. Taylor Mac. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997); Wright
v. Cent. Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1976); Kan. Malpractice Victims
Coal. v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251 (Kan. 1989); Chamberlain v. State, 624 So. 2d 874 (La.
1993), superseded by statute, LA. CONST. Art. XII; Brannigan v. Usalito, 587 A.2d
1232 (N.H. 1991); Carson v. Mauer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980); Trujillo v. City of
Albuquerque, 965 P.2d 305 (N.M. 1998); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D.
1979); State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio
1999); Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co., 644 N.E.2d 397 (Ohio 1994); Morris v. Savoy,
576 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio 1991); Lakin v. Senco Prods., 987 P.2d 463 (Ore. 1999);
Knowles v. U.S., 544 N.W.2d 183 (S.D. 1996); Lucas v. U.S., 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex.
1988); Condemarin v. Univ. Hosp., 775 P.2d 349 (Utah 1989); Sofie v. Fibreboard
Corp., 771 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1989); Ferdon v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701
N.W.2d 440 (Wis. 2005). For more cases striking down other tort reforms, see
Center for Justice & Democracy, "Tort Reforms" are Unconstitutional,available at
http://www.centerjd.org/free/mythbusters-free/MBUnconstitutional.htm (last visited on Oct. 15, 2006).
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Quid Pro Quo

In the compensation programs discussed above, the tradeoff is clear: remove the dispute from the jury but relieve the
plaintiff of the burden of proving fault. The plaintiff is left with
93
guaranteed compensation if certain conditions are met.
Whether such a system is adaptable to medical malpractice law
generally is a matter outside the scope of this article. 94 However, the only models being discussed to date incorporate some
form of fault. This stacks the process against the plaintiff.
More importantly, the fault standard means that there is no
reasonably just substitute for removing the common law claims
from civil courts with juries. The token benefits being offered to
offset the serious breach of individual liberty are neither factu95
ally nor legally sufficient.
The concept of a reasonably just substitute, or a quid pro
quo, was a common rationale for both worker's compensation
programs and nuclear power accident cases. 96 While a handful
93. The Supreme Court first alluded to this concept in a 1917 case upholding
New York's workmen's compensation law. See N.Y. Cen. R.R. Co. v. White, 243
U.S. 188, 201 (1917). The court stated:
Nor is it necessary, for the purposes of the present case, to say that a State
might, without violence to the constitutional guaranty of 'due process of
law,' suddenly set aside all common-law rules respecting liability between
employer and employee, without providing a reasonably just substitute ....
It perhaps may be doubted whether the State could abolish all rights of action on the one hand, or all defenses on the other, without setting up something adequate in their stead. No such question is here presented, and we
intimate no opinion on it. The statute under consideration sets aside one
body of rules only to establish another system in its place. If the employee is
no longer able to recover as much as before in case of being injured through
the employer's negligence, he is entitled to moderate compensation in all
cases of injury, and has a certain and speedy remedy without the difficulty
and expense of establishing negligence.
Id. at 201. The same reasoning was applied by the Supreme Court again in 1931
to uphold the Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 41 (1931).
94. A true no-fault health court would be cost-prohibitive. See also Studdert,
supra note 23, at 1 (arguing that cost is a prohibitive factor in creating a true nofault system for medical malpractice).
95. It is important to supplement a due process rational basis test with a quid
pro quo analysis because the rational basis test looks at society benefit but quid
pro quo goes further to require individual benefit to compensate for the loss of
right.
96. After the appearance of this analysis in the early worker's compensation
cases, quid pro quo remained relatively unexplored until Duke Power Co. v. Caro-
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of state courts have alluded to and revived the quid pro quo
analysis in other areas of medical malpractice "reforms" - using
the analysis to strike down caps on damages, 97 the establishment of medical review panels, 98 compulsory arbitration, 99 and
other limitations on plaintiffs' rights, how this quid pro quo
analysis fits into a typical constitutional challenge of a medical
malpractice proposal is a bit less clear. 00
State courts apply the concept rather loosely, sometimes incorporating it into a clear due process or equal protection rational basis analysis and other times alluding to the idea in
dicta. The United State Supreme Court, while applying a functional quid pro quo analysis and discussing the theory in dicta,
has yet to affirmatively incorporate it into a due process analysis. In fact, when the Court denied certiorari on a California
case upholding a non-economic cap on medical malpractice
damages in 1985, Justice White dissented and urged the Court
to review the issue of "whether due process requires a legislatively enacted compensation scheme to be a quid pro quo for the
lina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978). In Duke Power, the Court, in dicta,
stated that in the particular case of a nuclear accident, at which time there had
never been, would cause so much damage that a guaranteed funding stream of
$560 million was a reasonable substitute for state common law claims which had
never been utilized and for which their existed no precedent. Id. at 88. However,
the Court did not rely on this quid pro quo analysis for its holding. See also Howard Alan Learner, Restrictive Medical MalpracticeCompensation Schemes: A Constitutional 'Quid Pro Quo' Analysis to Safeguard Individual Liberties, 18 HARv.J.
ON LEGIS. 143 (1981).

97. See, e.g., Wright v. Cent. Du Page Hosp. Assoc., 347 N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1976).
98. Id.
99. Simon v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr., 355 N.E.2d 903 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. 1976).
100. States adopting some form of quid pro quo analysis within a due process
claim are: Kansas (Kan. Malpractice Victims Coal. v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251, 262 (Kan.
1988), overruled on other grounds by Bair v. Peck, 811 P.2d 1176 (Kan. 1991));
Florida (Smith v. Dep't of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987)); Texas (Lucas v. U.S.,
757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988)); Illinois (Wright v. Cent. Du Page Hosp. Assoc., 347
N.E.2d 736, 742 (Ill. 1976)); Utah (Condemarin v. Univ. Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 35760 (Utah 1989)); New Hampshir (Carson v. Hitchcock Clinic, 424 A.2d 825, 837-38
(N.H. 1980)); and Ohio (Simon v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr., 355 N.E.2d 903, 910
(Ohio 1976)). Other states that have alluded to a quid pro quo analysis in some
form are: Nebraska (Pendergast v. Nelson, 256 N.W.2d 657 (Neb. 1977)); Indiana
(Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 404 N.E.2d 585 (Ind. 1980)); California (Fein v.
Permanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d 665, 681 n.18 (Cal. 1985); and South Dakota
(Knowles v. U.S., 544 N.W.2d 183 (S.D. 1995) (relying on the "commensurate benefit" required by Florida courts in order for the legislature to restrict a constitutional right to jury)). Even so, each state court justifies and applies the analysis
differently.
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common-law or state-law remedy it replaces, and if so, how adequate it must be." 10 1 It is likely that health court pilot programs
will force the issue to be addressed directly by the Supreme
Court. Until then, the state courts provide some guidance.
In Samsel v. Wheeler TransportServices, Inc., the Supreme
Court of Kansas discussed the history of quid pro quo analysis,
concluding that
[s]tatutory modification of the common law must meet due process requirements and be reasonably necessary in the public interest to promote the general welfare of the people of the state.
Due process requires that the legislature substitute the viable
statutory remedy of quid pro quo (this for that) to replace the loss
10 2
of the right."
Kansas may very well be the state with the most judicial ink
spilt over the finer points of a quid pro quo analysis. However,
this type of reasoning has been applied in other states as
03
well.1
101. Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 474 U.S. 892, 894 (Cal. 1985) (White, J.,
dissenting). Justice White went on to correctly predict, "[ilt is likely that more
States will enact similar types of limitations, and that the issue will recur." Id.
102. Samsel v. Wheeler Transp. Serv., Inc., 789 P.2d 541, 555 (Kan. 1990)
(finding a quid pro quo was achieved with the particular reform at issue in that
case), overruled on other grounds by Bair v. Peck, 811 P.2d 1176 (Kan. 1991).
103. See Smith v. Dep't of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1089 (Fla. 1987) (striking
down a cap on non-economic damages). The court reasoned that:
We are dealing with a constitutional right which may not be restricted simply because the legislature deems it rational to do so. Rationality only becomes relevant if the legislature provides an alternative remedy or
abrogates or restricts the right based on a showing of overpowering public
necessity and that no alternative method of meeting that necessity exists.
Here, howeveie, the legislature has provided nothing in the way of an alternative remedy or commensurate benefit and one can only speculate, in an
act of faith, that somehow the legislative scheme will benefit the tort victim.
We cannot embrace such nebulous reasoning when a constitutional right is
involved.
Id. at 1089. See also Lucas v. U.S., 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988) (using quid pro quo
analysis to strike down medical malpractice damage caps as violations of the open
courts provision of the state constitution); Wright v. Cent. Du Page Hosp. Assoc.,
347 N.E. 2d 736, 742 (Ill. 1976). The court reasoning that:
Defendants argue that there is a societal quid pro quo in that loss of recovery potential to some malpractice victims is offset by 'lower insurance premiums and lower medical care costs for all recipients of medical care, .. .'
This quid pro quo does not extend to the seriously injured medical malpractice victim and does not serve to bring the limited recovery provision within
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A few states have specifically emphasized that the quid pro
quo must benefit the individual, not the more vague societal
benefits that are often deferred to in a rationality test. 0 4 In
essence, these states use the quid pro quo analysis to ratchet up
the level of scrutiny from a rationality test to an intermediate
level of scrutiny. Only one state, California, has alluded in
dicta that a societal benefit would be enough to satisfy a quid
pro quo requirement. 0 5 This was in response to legislative reforms that capped non-economic damages to $250,000.106
Even assuming arguendo that there is a public good to removing a select group of common law tort claims from civil
courts, something must be offered as compensation for that
right. Otherwise, as at least one scholar has noted, "the individual could be subject to a collusive scheme between business and
the state, justified by "'public benefit"' concerns, that would
leave him with even less structural protection than his prior
7
weak common-law tort remedy." 10
the rationale of the cases upholding the constitutionality of the Workmen's
Compensation Act.
Id. at 742; Simon v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr., 355 N.E.2d 903, 910 (Ohio 1976),
holding that
[iln short, there is simply no quid pro quo given by the Ohio Medical Malpractice Act for seriously injured malpractice victims in limiting the amount
of recoverable damages. This Court rejects, as did the Illinois Supreme
Court, the societal quid pro quo argument that some must give up their
rights to damages so that all can achieve cheaper medical care.
Id. at 910; Condemarin v. Univ. Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 357-60 (Utah 1989) (identifying a separate due process approach, the "quid pro quo" or "substitute remedy"
test); Carson v. Hitchcock Clinic, 424 A.2d 825, 837-38 (N.H. 1980) (explaining
that the plain language of the New Hampshire constitution requires a satisfactory
substitute if the legislature abolishes a right).
104. See Wright, 347 N.E. at 736; Simon, 355 N.E.2d at 903; Arneson v. Olson,
270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978); Carson, 424 A.2d at 825; Bell, 757 P.2d at 251;
Smith., 507 So. 2d at 1080; Lucas S.W.2d at 687.
105. Fein, 695 P.2d at 681 n.18 ("Indeed, even if due process principles required some 'quid pro quo' to support the statute, it would be difficult to say that
the preservation of a viable medical malpractice insurance industry in this state
was not an adequate benefit for the detriment the legislation imposes on malpractice plaintiffs.") It should also be noted that, even though California courts have to
date applied a rational basis analysis without any consideration of a quid pro quo
to tort reforms, this does not mean that the health courts will necessarily survive a
challenge in California.
106. Id.
107. See Learner, supra note 96, at 171.
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Proponents of the health court model have pointed to benefits such as "free legal representation," "efficiency," and
"quicker resolution," as reasonably just substitutes for a plaintiffs right to open access of the courts and right to trial by
jury. 108 At the outset, it is worth noting that there is no free
legal representation being offered as part of the health courts
model. An attorney is not mandatory, but neither is this true
for our civil justice system. Plaintiffs feel that they fare better
with an attorney representing them and it is safe to assume the
same will be true for the health courts, if not even more so as
the administrative tribunal will have less procedural safeguards in place to assure fairness. 10 9 Although it is true that a
plaintiff is given access to free "experts," these are experts
picked by a panel heavily weighted toward industry. 110 Moreover, claims of efficiency and speed of process are belied by almost every other alternative compensation system, each of
which is plagued with a host of bureaucratic and political capture problems.1 '
Even so, the main point is that these sorts of offerings do
not in any way equal the magnitude of what the plaintiff is being asked to relinquish. Other more vague societal "benefits"
being promised (greater access to healthcare, lower insurance
premiums) are both factually problematic and beside the
point. 1 12 Many studies have concluded that the civil justice system is not what is behind insurance premium and access
problems. 113
108. See Kirk B. Johnson et al., A Fault-BasedAdministrativeAlternative for
Resolving Medical Malpractice Claims, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1365, 1401 (1989).
109. Although attorneys are not needed in the alternative compensation
schemes discussed in Part II, the majority of claimants employ one. See, e.g., National Vaccine Fact Sheet, supra note 46 (stating that claimants are often represented by an attorney).
110. See discussion supra Part I and accompanying notes.
111. See, e.g., discussion supra Part II and accompanying notes.
112. Indeed, some states employing a straight rational basis analysis to medical liability reforms have held the reforms unconstitutional under state equal protection clauses because the state legislature's claims of greater access, etc. are
belied by the facts. See, e.g., Ferndon v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 682 N.W.2d
866 (Wis. 2005); Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983); Hoem v. State, 756
P.2d 780 (Wyo. 1988).
113. See, e.g., Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, Defensive Medicine &
DisappearingDoctors?, REGULATION, Fall 2005, at 31 ("First, increases in malpractice payments do not seem to be the driving force behind increases in premiums.
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Societal benefits are part of the rational basis review under
traditional due process analysis. However, they do not and
should not affect the quid pro quo analysis, which focuses on a
reasonably just substitute for an individual's right. 114 As the
Illinois court wrote:
Defendants argue that there is a societal [q]uid pro quo in that
the loss of recovery potential to some malpractice victims is offset
by 'lower insurance premiums and lower medical care costs for all
recipients of medical care.' This [q]uid pro quo does not extend to
the seriously injured medical malpractice victim and does not
serve to bring the limited recovery provision within the rationale
of the cases upholding the constitutionality of the Workmen's
115
Compensation Act.
The Illinois court struck down caps on non-economic damages in this case, but the same elements apply to health courts.
Not only will the health courts cap the damages as well, but the
process of an alternative system in itself is a further limitation
Second, increases in malpractice costs do not seem to affect the overall size of the
physician workforce, although they may affect some subsets of the physician population more severely."); Bernard Black et al., Stability, Not Crisis: Medical Malpractice Claim Outcomes in Texas, 1988-2002, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 207
(2005) (stating that the rapid changes in insurance premiums that sparked the
crisis appear to reflect insurance market dynamics, largely disconnected from
claim outcomes.); Medical Malpractice Insurance: Stable Losses/ Unstable Rates
2004 (Ams. For Ins. Reform, New York, N.Y), Oct. 2004, at 8, available at http:ll
www.insurance-reform.org/StableLosses04.pdf. The study found that:
While insurer payouts directly track the rate of medical inflation, medical
insurance premiums do not. Rather, they rise and fall in relationship to the
state of the economy. Not only has there been no 'explosion' in lawsuits, jury
awards or any tort system costs at any time during the last three decades,
but the astronomical premium increases that some doctors have been
charged during periodic insurance "crises" over this time period are in exact
sync with the economic cycle of the insurance industry, driven by interest
rates and investments ....In other words, insurance companies raise rates
when they are seeking ways to make up for declining interest rates and
market-based investment losses and reduction in interest rates.
Id. at 8; see also Amitabh Chandra et al., The Growth of Physician Medical Malpractice Payments: Evidence from the National PractitionerData Bank, HEALTH
AFFAIRS, May 31, 2005.
114. Another example of quid pro quo analysis is seen in labor cases, where
courts have upheld mandatory arbitration clauses as a reasonably just substitute
for the right to strike. See Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
115. See White v. Cent. Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 742 (Ill 1976);
Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 136 (N.D. 1978).
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on plaintiff's remedy. A vague promise of lower premiums and
greater access to care, especially where such promises are belied by numerous studies, does not establish a quid pro quo.
IV.

Other Constitutional Implications

As was made clear in Part III, the health court proposal
suffers from an insurmountable defect - it attempts to strip the
right to redress in the courts without offering anything up in
return. This quid pro quo is a long-recognized idea under constitutional analyses whenever a legislature attempts to narrow
the right to jury trial and remove a common law cause of action
from the civil justice system. Moreover, it is clear that the nature of the rights at issue, private common law tort rights, have
existed since the state constitutions were drafted and are therefore much harder to legislate away. The proposal is clearly constitutionally suspect for these reasons. The following sections
highlight state court reasoning on other tort reform measures
and why the health court proposal pushes the legislature's
power just too far.
The radical wholesale removal of plaintiff's common law
rights to redress in the state courts and the segregating of these
claims into alternative tribunals without procedural protections
and the right to a jury while retaining the requirement that
plaintiff prove fault will obviously not survive a constitutional
challenge in states that have already adopted a form of due process analysis that requires a quid pro quo. Arguably the health
court proposal is so egregious that some states that haven't
needed to delve into quid pro quo analyses in the past may begin to explore this theory. More states will strike down the
health courts based on regular due process or equal protection
analysis. A great majority of states that have addressed reforms in the past have indicated that a plan like health courts
would violate state constitutional rights to jury.
A.

Due Process

Having established the importance of a right to redress for
private rights, as well as the long-standing tradition of a right
to a jury in civil matters (whether protected by the federal constitution or one of the many state constitutional provisions), it
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is clear that when the legislature attempts to change the nature
of these rights the courts are justified in applying something
akin to intermediate scrutiny. 116 This level of scrutiny asks
whether the elimination of such a strong right is proportionate
to, and advances, the ends sought.
Some scholars have posited that a due process analysis that
combines a rationality test with a quid pro quo inquiry creates a
particular type of intermediate scrutiny that should apply to
medical malpractice reforms. 1 7 Since the Supreme Court has
yet to state definitively whether a quid pro quo determination is
part of a due process challenge to a legislative amendment of a
common law right, the states have been left to devise their own
understandings, based on state constitutions. This has resulted
in slight theoretical differences. The majority of states employing a quid pro quo analysis do so as part of a due process analysis, with the result being that suggested above: a level of
scrutiny higher than rational basis. Other states apply a
heightened level of scrutiny without reference to a quid pro quo
determination. 118 Wisconsin recently applied a "rational basis
119
with bite test" to strike down caps on non-economic damages.
In any of these states, health courts will have a near-impossible
116. Some states analyze these claims under state constitutional provisions
requiring open access to the courts or a right to a remedy.
117. See Learner, supra note 96.
118. Arguably, the addition of a "fairness" prong to a rational basis test often
comes from the same impulse as quid pro quo. See, e.g., Carson v. Thompson, 424
A.2d 825, 837 (N.H. 1980); Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 134-35.
119. Ferndon v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 460-61 (Wis.
2005). The court stated:
Constitutional law scholar Professor Gerald Gunther wrote, however, as follows that rational basis with teeth 'is not the same as 'intermediate scrutiny': [Rational basis with teeth] does not take issue with the heightened
scrutiny tiers of 'strict' and 'intermediate' review. Instead, it is solely addressed to the appropriate intensity of review to be exercised when the lowest tier, that of rationality review, is deemed appropriate ....
What the
[rational basis with teeth model] asks is that some teeth be put into that
lowest level of scrutiny, that it be applied 'with bite,' focusing on means
without second-guessing legislative ends. (Evaluating the importance of the
ends is characteristic of all higher levels of scrutiny.) In short, [rational basis with teeth raises] slightly the lowest tier of review under the two- or
three-tier models; but it does not seek to raise the 'mere rationality' level
appropriate for run-of-the-mill economic regulation cases all the way up to
the level of 'intermediate' or of 'strict' scrutiny.

Id. (quoting

GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw
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hurdle to pass constitutional muster because of the combination
of the long-standing common law nature of the cause of action,
negligence, and the wholesale removal of this cause of action
from review by a jury. Moreover, the health courts offer no quid
pro quo to mitigate removal of such an important right. Instead
they merely shift plaintiffs into a new forum without any procedural safeguards or constitutional oversight.
B.

Equal Protection

Analytically, due process and equal protection challenges
often parallel each other. Once the level of scrutiny is determined, the assessment of the legislation is generally the same.
This separate section is included in order to clarify which state
courts have relied more heavily on equal protection grounds
when assessing previous tort reform proposals. The practical
effect of this determination would forecast which states may
strike down health courts without even engaging in a quid pro
quo analysis.
States that have struck down previous medical liability reforms on equal protection grounds often apply a means-end test.
This is sometimes described as rational basis scrutiny, and
some states have invalidated reforms even under such a deferential level of scrutiny. 120 Other courts have applied traditional
intermediate scrutiny, asking whether the legislation is "reasonable, not arbitrary, and ...rest[s] upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation." 121 These cases have usually found that the medical
liability reforms under scrutiny are not responsive to the perceived problems, but rather serve only to disadvantage some
population unreasonably. The Wyoming court went even further, stating:
The continued availability and vitality of * * * causes of action
[against health care providers] serve an important public policy 120. Id.; Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983); Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d
780 (Wyo. 1988).
121. Carson, 424 A.2d at 831 (applying intermediate scrutiny to an omnibus
medical malpractice statute and striking down a variety of limitations on litigants'
rights). Arizona actually applies strict scrutiny, see Kenyon v. Hammer, 688 P.2d
961, 975 (Ariz. 1984) (finding right to access the court for a negligence claim is a
fundamental right and therefore three-year statute of limitations was
unconstitutional).
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the preservation of quality health care for the citizens of this state
Constitutional protections exist for litigants regardless of
market conditions for insurance companies and the medical industry; concerns about the latter cannot be allowed to overrun the
122
former at the expense of those injured by malpractice.
C.

Right to Jury / Open Access to Courts

In discussing the role of the jury, the United States Supreme Court has stated: "Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in
our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of
the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost
care." 1 23 All states except Colorado and Louisiana have provisions in their state constitutions guaranteeing the right to a
jury in civil trials and/or the right to access the courts for civil
matters. 124 Litigants often use these provisions to challenge
tort reforms. At least eight states have invalidated damage caps
based on their state constitutional provisions of a right to a

122. Hoem, 756 P.2d at 783-84 (quoting Greenwood v. Wierdsma, 741 P.2d
1079, 1088 (Wyo. 1987) and Waggoner v. Gibson, 647 F. Supp. 1102, 1107 (N.D.
Tex. 1986)).

123. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935).
124. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 11; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 16; ARIz. CONST. art. II,
§ 23; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 7; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 19;
DEL. CONST. art. I, § 4; FLA. CONST. art. I § 22; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1; HAW. CONST.
art. I, § 13; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 7; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 13; IND. CONST. art. I, § 20;
IOWA CONST. art. I, § 9; KAN.CONST. B. of R. § 5; Ky. CONST. § 7; ME.CONST. art. I,
§ 20; MD. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS, art. V; MASS. CONST. Pt. I, art. XV; MICH..
CONST. art. I, § 14; MINN. CONST. Art. I § 4; Miss. CONST. art. III, § 31; Mo. CONST.
art. I, § 22(a); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 26; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 6; NEV. CONST. art.
I, § 3; N.H. CONST. Pt. 1, art. XX; N.J. CONST. art. I, 9; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 12;
N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 18; N.C. CONST. § 1A-1, R. 38; N.D. CONST. art I, § 13; OHIo
CONST. art. I, § 5; OKLA.CONST. art. II, § 19; OR. CONST. art. I, § 17; PA. CONST. art.
I; § 6; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 15; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 14; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 6;
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 6; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 10; VT.
CONST. Ch. 1, art. XII; VA. CONST. art. I, § 11; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 21; W.VA.
CONST. art. III,, § 13; WISC. CONST. art. I, § 5; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 9.
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jury. 125 A few more states have invalidated other medical liabil126
ity reforms under their right to jury provisions.
Even where state courts have previously upheld tort reforms against such challenges, it is very likely that the health
court proposal is too radical an encroachment upon these rights
and many state courts will be inclined to find the health courts
unconstitutional. For example, in Virginia, the court upheld
caps on damages by stressing the importance of the jury in assessing facts, but distinguishing the decision as to amount of
damages from a factual inquiry. 127 A similar rationale is found
in Delaware, where the court upheld a medical review panel
against a right to jury trial challenge. 28 The Delaware court
repeatedly stressed that the statute in question was constitutional because it did not remove any question of fact from the
jury.

12 9

This type of analysis is seen in almost every state that has
upheld tort reforms against challenges based on state constitutional provisions safeguarding a right to jury trial. 130 It is likely
125. See, e.g., Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1992);
Smith v. Schulte, 671 So. 2d 1334 (Ala. 1995); Kan. Malpractice Victims Coal. v.
Bell, 757 P.2d 251 (Kan. 1988); Duren v. Suburban Cmty. Hosp., 495 N.E.2d 51
(Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1985); Lakin v. Senco Prods., 987 P.2d 463 (Ore. 1999); Knowles
v. U.S., 544 N.W.2d 183 (S.D. 1996); Lucas v. U.S., 757 S.W.2d 692 (Tex 1988);
Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1989).
126. Lloyd Noland Hosp. v. Durham, 906 So. 2d 157 (Ala. 2005) (periodic payment schedules); Wright v. Cent. Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 741 (Ill.
1976) (medical review panels); Condemarin v. Univ. Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 357-60
(Utah 1989) (liability limit for state hospitals); Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87, 91
(R.I. 1983) (striking down Reform Act under EPC, but in dicta doubting it would
pass muster under jury trial challenge).
127. Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989); see also Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Servs. of Richmond, 509 S.E.2d 307 (Va. 1999).
128. Lacy v. Green, 428 A.2d 1171 (Del. Super. Ct. 1981) ("The parties remain
free to call, examine and cross-examine witnesses as if the pretrial panel opinion
had not been made ... [the statute in question] cuts off no defenses, interposes no
obstacle to full consideration of all the issues, and takes no question of fact from
the jury.").
129. Id.
130. Adams v. Children's Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898 (Mo. 1992); Kirkland
v. Blaine County. Med. Ctr., 4 P.3d 1115 (Idaho 2000); Murphy v. Edmonds, 601
A.2d 102 (Md. 1992); Peters v. Saft, 597 A.2d 50 (Me. 1991) (noting that even some
damage caps may go to far by eliminating the remedy altogether); English v. New.
England Med. Ctr., 541 N.E.2d 329 (Mass. 1989); Wright v. Colleton County. Sch.
Dist., 391 S.E.2d 564 (S.C. 1990); Robinson v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 414
S.E.2d 877 (W. Va. 1991); Evans ex rel. Kutch v. State, 56 P.3d 1046 (Alaska 2002);
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that these courts will find the health courts to be violations of
the right to jury because the proposal removes the entire proceeding from a jury. Each of these courts upholding previous
tort reforms wrote language strongly reaffirming the importance of the jury as a fact-finding body. The same courts will
have a hard time justifying the wholesale removal of facts from
the jury.
This article analyzes the possible application of state constitutional rights to jury trials because to date the main push
for health courts has been on the state level. However, the Progressive Policy Institute has proposed that in five years, the Department of Health and Human Services should be required to
reassess the performance of the state pilot programs and
"[sipecifically, the president and Congress may need to preempt
state and medical malpractice laws and establish federal health
courts in states that choose to forgo federal start-up funds and
131
avoid creating health courts on their own."
Such a plan would encounter serious Seventh Amendment
problems, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly limited Congress' ability to abolish a jury trial remedy for common law pri132
vate rights.
V.

Conclusion

To listen to the health court advocates, one would think
that segmenting off certain claims into parallel "court" systems
is benign and commonplace. Anyone reading this article knows
that this simply is not true. We do not have separate courts for
criminal and civil matters even though these areas differ completely. We trust that our judges and juries can adapt easily
between civil and criminal matters. More than this, we need
judges who can understand common law in its varied forms in
order for our system to thrive. Medical malpractice is not a sepBarret v. Baird, 908 P.2d 689 (Nev. 1995); Wiley v. Henry Ford Cottage Hosp., 668
N.W.2d 402 (Mich. 2003).
131. PPI pamphlet, supra note 12, at 14. A federal system is also mentioned
in the transcript from Common Good's October 31, 2006 panel discussion, see Transcript, supra note 12, at 7 (mentioning that a federal system would "represent[ ] a
deviation from the historical locus of control over malpractice law, which has been
the states."). This, of course, has larger federalism concerns that this article does
not focus on.
132. See Seventh Amendment jurisprudence discussed supra note 27.
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arate body of law; it is part and parcel of ordinary tort law that
has been enshrined in the common law since the beginning of
our civil justice system.
The common law is built upon a generalist system. It is
this concept that first year law students struggle to understand
when they try to find other cases based on subject matter rather
than legal principle. The legal principle at issue may jump
across subject matters and specialty areas. Indeed, negligence
law is found in many subject areas, not just medical malpractice. Segmenting out medical cases does not make a more coherent and unified body of law; on the contrary, it makes a body
of law that is unanswerable to centuries of procedural and substantive precedents. This is a legislative attempt to weaken the
judicial system.
This article examines state court analyses of previous legislative attempts to curb plaintiff's' access to the civil justice system and, by doing, provides a reasoned prediction for how the
proposed health courts might fare against constitutional challenges. The results are clear - the health court proposal as currently designed will most likely be found unconstitutional by a
great majority of states. 133 Given the fact that many states will
find such proposals unconstitutional, should Congress really be
spending valuable time debating and passing a pilot-funding
program? Moreover, although the Supreme Court has yet to define the parameters of a quid pro quo test, the current health
courts proposal will very likely push the Court toward such a
ruling.
The public relations spin on these health courts is based on
misinformation: that they are "no-fault" and similar to other
specialized court systems and/or administrative compensation
133. Of the thirty-nine states that have written decisions based on previous
constitutional challenges to medical liability reforms, at least thirty-three of them
are constrained by their own precedent to strike down health courts as proposed.
Arguably, the remaining six states (Louisiana, Missouri, California, New Mexico,
New Jersey, and Colorado) might also deem health courts unconstitutional, however their precedents are not quite as strongly written. In the ten states (Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, New York, Oklahoma,
Tennessee, and Vermont, including the District of Columbia) that either have
never imposed limits to the tort system or have never challenged their limits in
court, we of course have no way to predict how their courts will interpret their
state constitutions. Regardless, a clear majority of states will most likely strike
these courts down.
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schemes. The truth is that these health "courts" are an industry-sponsored attempt to weaken the civil justice system; and
because the industry players aligned with such an agenda know
entirely how undemocratic such an agenda is, they have spent
very little time rebutting the serious constitutional issues with
actual legal arguments. Instead, the public is redirected and
calmed by analogies to long-standing (albeit problematic and
inefficient) programs like worker's compensation. Meanwhile
corporations remain one step closer to creating an America
where the average person has no recourse for injury caused by
negligent or unsafe practices.
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